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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH 
CAROLINA PROPERTY LAW 
WHERE’S THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH 
CAROLINA?* 
JOHN V. ORTH** 
From its creation in 1818 until the creation of the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals in 1967, the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
was the state’s sole appellate court. As such, it was solely 
responsible for the development of the state’s common law. At 
first, the creation of an intermediate appellate court did not 
change that situation. Created to address the burgeoning number 
of appeals following the great expansion of federal rights for 
criminal defendants in the mid-twentieth century, the Court of 
Appeals was originally intended to be a court for the correction 
of error rather than a precedent-setting court. But in 1989 the 
Supreme Court held that where one panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided an issue, subsequent panels are bound by 
that precedent unless it is overturned by a higher court. From 
1989 until today, state law has in many instances been shaped by 
decisions of three-judge panels of the Court of Appeals rather 
than by the seven-member Supreme Court. This Article focuses 
on several significant decisions concerning basic property law 
that have been made by panels of the Court of Appeals and 
explores the consequences of delegating the Supreme Court’s 
precedent-setting function to panels of the intermediate appellate 
court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina was first created by 
statute in 1818.1 Prior to that year, the Court of Conference, 
composed of superior court judges, had functioned as the state’s 
highest court.2 As constituted by the 1818 court act, the Supreme 
Court was the state’s only appellate court.3 As such, it was solely 
responsible for maintaining and developing the state’s common law. 
The court continued in that role, with enhanced status after 1868, 
when the state’s new constitution vested in it “the Judicial power of 
the State[.]”4 
In 1965, the North Carolina Constitution was amended to 
reconstitute the judicial branch. The amendment created the 
 
 1. Act of Nov. 17, 1818, ch. 1, 1818 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, 3–5. 
 2. Originally created by statute in 1799, Act of Nov. 18, 1799, ch. 4, 1799 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 133, 133–35, the court did not receive the official name of Court of Conference until 
1801, Act of Nov. 16, 1801, ch. 12, §	1, 1801 N.C. Sess. Laws 176, 176. In 1805, the court’s 
title was changed to Supreme Court, Act of Nov. 18, 1805, ch. 1, §	1, 1805 N.C. Sess. Laws 
1, but it continued to be composed of superior court judges and to be commonly referred 
to as the Court of Conference. See Walter Clark, The Supreme Court of North Carolina, 4 
GREEN BAG 457, 459 (1892). 
 3. Act of Nov. 17, 1818, ch. 1, 1818 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, 3–5. 
 4. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, §	4 (“The Judicial power of the State shall be vested 
in a court for the trial of impeachments, a Supreme Court, Superior Courts, courts of 
Justices of the Peace, and Special Courts.”). Among the various courts referred to, only 
the Supreme Court was an appellate court of general jurisdiction. Id. §	10 
The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, an[y] decision 
of the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference; but no issue of fact 
shall be tried before this court: and the court shall have power to issue any 
remedial writs necessary, to give it a general supervision and control of the inferior 
courts. 
Id. 
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Appellate Division of the General Court of Justice, consisting of the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.5 The amendment 
authorized a Supreme Court composed of up to nine justices, 
although the court continues to function with seven, as it has since 
1937.6 On January 1, 1967, legislation provided for a Court of Appeals 
staffed with six judges.7 In 1969, the number of Court of Appeals 
judges increased to nine;8 in 1977, to twelve;9 and, in 2000, to fifteen.10 
The Court of Appeals sits in panels consisting of three judges each, 
assigned by the Chief Judge, “in such fashion that each member sits a 
substantially equal number of times with each other member.”11 
Rotation of the judges was intended “to prevent the growth of 
diverging bodies of case law among various panels of fixed 
membership.”12 
On its creation, the Court of Appeals was expected to be 
primarily responsible for the correction of errors made at the trial 
level, leaving the Supreme Court with responsibility for review of 
“those cases having [the] added dimension of general jurisprudential 
significance[,]” whether decisions of a trial court or of the Court of 
 
 5. See AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1776–1996, at 
14 (John L. Sanders & John F. Lomax, Jr. eds., 1997). After the revision of the North 
Carolina Constitution, approved by the voters on November 3, 1970 (effective January 1, 
1971), the provision appears in the North Carolina Constitution at article IV, section	5. See 
JOHN V. ORTH & PAUL MARTIN NEWBY, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONSTITUTION 130 (2d ed. 2013). 
 6. Act of Feb. 3, 1937, ch. 16, 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 47, 47 (increasing number of 
justices from five to seven, as authorized by a constitutional amendment adopted in 1935); 
see N.C. CONST. art. IV, §	6; Act of May 11, 1935, ch. 444, sec. 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 745, 
745; see also AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 5, 
at 8. 
 7. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	7A-16 (2015) (“The Court of Appeals is created effective 
January 1, 1967. It shall consist initially of six judges .	.	.	.”). 
 8. Id. (“Effective January 1, 1969, the number of judges is increased to nine .	.	.	.”). 
 9. Id. (“Effective January 1, 1977, the number of judges is increased to 12 .	.	.	.”). For 
the early history of the Court of Appeals, see DAVID M. BRITT, COURT OF APPEALS OF 
NORTH CAROLINA: THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, 1967–1992, at 2–8 (1992). 
 10. §	7A-16 (“On or after December 15, 2000, the Governor shall appoint three 
additional judges to increase the number of judges to 15.”). But see Act to Reduce the 
Number of Judges on the Court of Appeals to Twelve, sec. 1, §	7A-16, 2017-2 N.C. Adv. 
Legis. Serv. 37, 37 (LexisNexis) (“On or after January 1, 2017, whenever the seat of an 
incumbent judge becomes vacant prior to the expiration of the judge’s term due to death, 
resignation, retirement, impeachment, or removal pursuant to G.S. 7A-374.2(8) of the 
incumbent judge, that seat is abolished until the total number of Court of Appeals seats is 
decreased to 12.”). 
 11. §	7A-16. 
 12. STATE OF N.C. COURTS COMM’N, REPORT OF THE COURTS COMMISSION TO THE 
NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 7 (1967). 
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Appeals.13 In consequence, there was an appeal of right from the 
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court in any case that “directly 
involves a substantial question arising under the Constitution of the 
United States or of this State.”14 In addition, there was an appeal of 
right from any decision of the Court of Appeals “[i]n which there is a 
dissent[.]”15 In other cases that have “significant public interest” or 
that involve “legal principles of major significance to the 
jurisprudence of the State,” the Supreme Court could certify a cause 
for review on the motion of a party or on its own motion.16 In a few 
 
 13. Id. at 13. As the Courts Commission itself recognized, “These two functions of 
course are frequently carried on simultaneously. In many cases the general law is clarified 
or expanded in the very process of correcting trial court error in the individual case.” Id. at 
12. 
 14. N.C. Gen. Stat. §	7A-30 (2015). The complete grounds for appeals as of right from 
Court of Appeals decisions are as follows: 
Except as provided in G.S. 7A-28 [concerning decisions of Court of Appeals on 
post-trial motions for appropriate relief, valuation of exempt property, or courts-
martial], an appeal lies of right to the Supreme Court from any decision of the 
Court of Appeals rendered in a case: (1) Which directly involves a substantial 
question arising under the Constitution of the United States or of this State, or (2) 
In which there is a dissent. 
Id.; See also Robert Orr, What Exactly Is a “Substantial Constitutional Question” for 
Purposes of Appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court?, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 211 
(2011) (analyzing the “statutory right of appeal based on a substantial constitutional 
question”). North Carolina General Statutes section	7A-30 was amended in December 
2016 to render unavailable the appeal of right in a case decided by a panel in which there 
was a dissent “until after the Court of Appeals sitting en banc has rendered a decision in 
the case .	.	. or until after the time for filing a motion for rehearing of the cause by the 
Court of Appeals has expired or the Court of Appeals has denied the motion for 
rehearing.” Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(c), §	7A-30(2), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 
32.  
 15. §	7A-30; see Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(c), §	7A-30, 2016 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 10, 32; see also N.C. R. APP. P. 16(b); Thomas L. Fowler, Appellate Rule 16(b): The 
Scope of Review in an Appeal Based Solely upon a Dissent in the Court of Appeals, 24 N.C. 
CENT. L. J. 1, 5 (2001). 
 16. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	7A-31(b)(1)–(2) (2015). “[T]he Supreme Court may, in its 
discretion, on motion of any party to the cause or on its own motion, certify the cause for 
review by the Supreme Court, either before or after it has been determined by the Court 
of Appeals.” Id. §	7A-31(a). Certification before determination by the Court of Appeals 
may be allowed 
when in the opinion of the Supreme Court: (1) The subject matter of the appeal 
has significant public interest, or (2) The cause involves legal principles of major 
significance to the jurisprudence of the State, or (3) Delay in final adjudication is 
likely to result from failure to certify and thereby cause substantial harm, or (4) 
The work load of the courts of the appellate division is such that the expeditious 
administration of justice requires certification. 
§	7A-31(b).  
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cases, there was an appeal of right from a trial court directly to the 
Supreme Court.17 
In 1989, in In re Appeal from Civil Penalty,18 the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina held: “where a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel 
of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been 
overturned by a[n intervening decision from] a higher court.”19 
Although this holding made theoretically impossible “diverging 
bodies of case law”20 among different panels of the Court of 
Appeals,21 the Chief Judge continued to rotate the judges among the 
 
Certification after determination by the Court of Appeals may be allowed when in 
the opinion of the Supreme Court: (1) The subject matter of the appeal has 
significant public interest, or (2) The cause involves legal principles of major 
significance to the jurisprudence of the State, or (3) The decision of the Court of 
Appeals appears to be in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court. 
§	7A-31(c). 
 17. §	7A-27(a)(1) (sentences of death); §	7A-27(a)(2)–(3) (certain decisions of the 
business court); §	7A-27(a1), repealed by Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(b), §	7A-
27(a1), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 31 (decisions by a special three-judge Superior Court 
holding a state statute “facially invalid” for violation of the North Carolina Constitution or 
federal law). §	7A-27 was amended in December 2016 to abolish the appeal of right to the 
Supreme Court from decisions by the special three-judge Superior Court holding a state 
statute unconstitutional, so any appeal would now lie to the Court of Appeals. Act of Dec. 
16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(c), §	7A-27(a1), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 31. 
 18. 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989). 
 19. Id. at 384, 379 S.E.2d at 37 (citing Monroe Cty., Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
690 F. 2d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 1982); Caldwell v. Ogden Sea Transp., Inc., 618 F.2d 1037, 
1041 (4th Cir. 1980)). There is an exception to the precedent-setting function of the Court 
of Appeals when a decision of a panel is affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court. In 
that case, the judgment below is affirmed “without precedential value.” E.g., Faires v. 
State Bd. of Elections, 368 N.C. 825, 825, 784 S.E.2d 463, 464 (2016) (citing State v. Long, 
365 N.C. 5, 705 S.E.2d 735 (2011) (per curiam); State v. Greene, 298 N.C. 268, 258 S.E.2d 
71 (1979) (per curiam)); State v. Franklin, 367 N.C. 183, 183, 752 S.E.2d 143, 143 (2013) 
(citing Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary, 365 N.C. 305, 716 S.E.2d 849 (2011); 
Goldston v. State, 364 N.C. 416, 700 S.E.2d 223 (2010)); see also John V. Orth, “Without 
Precedential Value”—When the Justices of the North Carolina Supreme Court Are Equally 
Divided, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1719, 1732–38 (2015) (criticizing the denial of precedential value 
to appellate decisions affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court); infra Part VI 
(discussing whether the Court of Appeals sitting en banc would be bound by a precedent 
set by a three-judge panel). 
 20. N.C. COURTS COMM’N, supra note 12, at 7. 
 21. For examples of real or apparent divergences among panels of the Court of 
Appeals, see John V. Orth, Why the North Carolina Court of Appeals Should Have a 
Procedure for Sitting En Banc, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1981, 1982–84 (1997). At the time In re 
Civil Penalty was decided, the Court of Appeals, staffed by twelve judges, sat in four 
panels; since 2000, when the size of the court was increased to fifteen, it sits in five panels. 
It is uncertain how the court will function as its authorized strength is progressively 
reduced. Cf. supra note 10. 
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panels.22 Since the Court of Appeals originally had no procedure for 
sitting en banc, the decision of one panel of the Court of Appeals was 
the decision of the entire court. As a result, since 1989, North 
Carolina common law has been, in significant cases, developed by 
three-judge panels of rotating membership rather than by the seven-
member Supreme Court. 
Recently, significant changes have been made to North 
Carolina’s appellate procedure. On December 16, 2016, the North 
Carolina General Assembly adopted Senate Bill 4, authorizing the 
Court of Appeals to sit “en banc to hear or rehear any cause upon a 
vote of the majority of the judges of the court.”23 This law would 
change the appellate procedure that is described in this Article and 
that was followed in the cases discussed herein. The new statute 
would allow the Court of Appeals sitting en banc to rehear a case 
decided by a panel that involved a constitutional issue.24 It would also 
render unavailable the appeal of right in a case decided by a panel in 
which there was a dissent “until after the Court of Appeals sitting en 
banc has rendered a decision in the case .	.	. or until after the time for 
filing a motion for rehearing of the cause by the Court of Appeals has 
expired or the Court of Appeals has denied the motion for 
rehearing.”25 
A suit that makes a “facial challenge” to the constitutionality of 
an act of the General Assembly is heard by a special three-judge 
superior court.26 Prior to the passage of Senate Bill 4, if that court 
held the act unconstitutional, there was an appeal of right to the 
Supreme Court.27 Senate Bill 4 abolishes the appeal of right to the 
 
 22. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	7A-16 (2015). 
 23. Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(a), §	7A-16, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 30. The 
en banc procedure that is authorized by this statute is implemented by North Carolina 
Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 31.1, adopted by the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina on December 22, 2016. N.C. SUPREME COURT, ORDER ADOPTING RULE 31.1 
OF THE NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, 369 N.C. ___, ___ (Dec. 
22, 2016) http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/html/pdf/Rule-31.1.pdf [https://perma.cc
/M9L4-C6R4].  
 24. See Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(b), §	7A-27, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 31. 
 25. Id. sec. 22.(c), §	7A-30, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws at 32. 
 26. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	1-267.1(a1) (2015) (providing that “any facial challenge to the 
validity of an act of the General Assembly shall be transferred .	.	. to the Superior Court of 
Wake County and shall be heard and determined by a three-judge panel of the Superior 
Court of Wake County”). 
 27. §	7A-27(a1), repealed by Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(b), §	7A-27(a1), 
2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 31 (providing an appeal of right in case of decision by a special 
three-judge superior court holding a state statute “facially invalid” for violation of the 
North Carolina Constitution or federal law). 
95 N.C. L. REV 1561 (2017) 
2017] DEVELOPMENTS IN N.C. PROPERTY LAW 1567 
 
Supreme Court, so any appeal now lies to the Court of Appeals.28 
Similarly, appeals from a decision of the special three-judge superior 
court that declared invalid an act redistricting congressional or 
legislative districts, once directed to the Supreme Court,29 are now 
also routed to the Court of Appeals.30 
The present Article focuses on several significant decisions 
concerning basic North Carolina property law that were made by 
three-judge panels of the Court of Appeals and not reviewed by the 
Supreme Court. The cases decided a wide array of basic property 
issues: (1) whether the state is constitutionally required to pay interest 
on unclaimed personal property in its possession; (2) whether a 
commercial tenant may waive a landlord’s duty to mitigate damages 
in case of tenant abandonment; (3) whether the common law Rule 
Against Perpetuities applies to a right of first refusal in a lease; (4) 
whether a perpetual private noncharitable trust violates the state 
constitutional prohibition of perpetuities; and (5) whether an action 
to enjoin a continuing encroachment on an easement is subject to the 
running of a six-year statute of limitations. The decisions in all these 
cases are subject to criticism, but the object of this Article is not to 
advocate for any particular result. 
Instead, this Article explores the consequences of effectively 
delegating the Supreme Court’s precedent-setting function to the 
intermediate appellate court. It notes the effect of precedents set by 
Court of Appeals decisions in cases in which no review was sought by 
the Supreme Court, as well as in cases in which appeals were 
dismissed or petitions for discretionary review were denied. Finally, 
this Article concludes that the constitutional plan of relieving the 
Supreme Court of the burden of correcting error in order to allow the 
court the opportunity to develop the state’s common law has been 
severely compromised. 
 
 28. Act of Dec. 16, 2016, sec. 22.(b), 2016 N.C. Session Laws 10 at 31. 
 29. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	120-2.5. 
 30. Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(f), §	120-2.5, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10 at 33 
(repealing N.C. GEN. STAT. §	120-2.5). 
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I.  UNCLAIMED PERSONAL PROPERTY—STATE’S DUTY TO PAY 
INTEREST 
In 2008, in Rowlette v. State,31 a panel of the Court of Appeals 
held that the state’s retention of interest earned on unclaimed 
personal property in its possession is not an unconstitutional taking. 
In Rowlette, Plaintiffs owned personal property that was 
transferred to the custody of the state treasurer pursuant to the 
Unclaimed Property Act.32 While in the custody of the treasurer, 
Plaintiffs’ property paid dividends to the state and accrued “funds”—
presumably interest.33 Having proved their ownership to the 
satisfaction of the treasurer, Plaintiffs received the value of their 
property as it was when the treasurer first took custody of it but not 
the dividends and interest that it had produced since then.34 Pursuant 
to the statute, the treasurer holds unclaimed property “without 
liability for income or gain.”35 Plaintiffs claimed that the treasurer’s 
retention of the dividends and interest was an unconstitutional taking 
under both the state and the federal constitutions.36 The superior 
court judge dismissed the complaint.37 
 
 31. 188 N.C. App. 712, 656 S.E.2d 619 (2008), perm. app. granted, disc. rev. denied, 362 
N.C. 474, 666 S.E.2d 487 (2008).  
 32. Id. at 713, 656 S.E.2d at 620; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§	116B-51 to -80. While 
raising a presumption that unclaimed property has been abandoned, §	116B-53(c), the 
statute nonetheless characterizes the state’s possession of the property as mere “custody,” 
§	116B-56(a), -63(b). The drafters of the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, on which the 
North Carolina statute is based, maintain that “[t]he owner’s rights are never cut off; 
under this Act, the owner’s rights exist in perpetuity.” UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT §	16 
cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1995). I have previously argued that Rowlette was wrongly 
decided. John V. Orth, Interest Follows Principal: Why North Carolina Should Pay Interest 
on Unclaimed Personal Property, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 321, 331–32 (2015). I do not 
intend to re-argue that point. I mention Rowlette in this Article as an example of a 
significant property issue resolved by a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals and 
unreviewed by the Supreme Court. 
 33. Rowlette, 188 N.C. App. at 712, 656 S.E.2d at 620. 
 34. Id. at 712–13, 656 S.E.2d at 620. 
 35. N.C. GEN. STAT §	116B-64. 
 36. Rowlette, 188 N.C. App. at 714, 656 S.E.2d at 620; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No 
person shall .	.	. be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”); N.C. CONST. 
art. I, §	19 (“No person shall be .	.	. deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law 
of the land.”). Although the North Carolina Constitution lacks an express takings clause 
comparable to the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the principle has 
been found implicit in the law of the land clause. See ORTH & NEWBY, supra note 5, at 70. 
 37. Rowlette, 188 N.C. App. at 714, 656 S.E.2d at 620–21. From October 1, 2015 to 
December 16, 2016, cases that challenged a state statute under the state constitution or 
federal law were assigned to a special three-judge superior court. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	1-
267.1(a1) (“[A]ny facial challenge to the validity of an act of the General Assembly shall 
95 N.C. L. REV 1561 (2017) 
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The Court of Appeals unanimously rejected Plaintiffs’ claim and 
affirmed the dismissal of their complaint.38 Stressing the presumption 
that state legislation is constitutional39 and that unclaimed property 
was “abandoned,”40 the court held that Plaintiffs’ loss was attributable 
to their own “neglect.”41 Citing several United States Supreme Court 
decisions, the Court of Appeals relied principally on Texaco, Inc. v. 
Short,42 which upheld the constitutionality of Indiana’s Mineral Lapse 
Act.43 That statute provided that a severed mineral interest that is 
unused for twenty years automatically lapses and reverts to the 
current surface owner, unless the mineral owner filed a timely 
statement of claim in the registry of deeds.44 Quoting Texaco, the 
Court of Appeals noted that “[t]he [United States] Supreme Court 
‘has never required the State to compensate [an] owner for the 
consequences of his own neglect .	.	.	.’	”45 The Court of Appeals also 
relied on decisions of appellate courts in Pennsylvania, Indiana, 
Louisiana, and Ohio that upheld the retention of interest on 
unclaimed property.46 
 
be transferred .	.	. to the Superior Court of Wake County and shall be heard and 
determined by a three-judge panel of the Superior Court of Wake County.”). If that court 
found the statute “facially invalid,” there was an appeal of right to the Supreme Court. Id. 
For criticism of this statute, see Joshua A. Yost, Comment, “If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix 
It”: Evaluating North Carolina’s Creation of a Three-Judge Court to Hear Constitutional 
Challenges to State Law, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1893, 1896 (2015). Now, because of legislation 
passed on December 16, 2016, cases that challenge the constitutionality of a statute are 
directed to the Court of Appeals. Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(c), §	7A-27(a1), 
2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 31. 
 38. Rowlette, 188 N.C. App. at 723, 656 S.E.2d at 626. 
 39. Id. at 714–15, 656 S.E.2d at 621 (“In challenging the constitutionality of a statute, 
the burden of proof is on the challenger, and the statute must be upheld unless its 
unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears beyond a reasonable 
doubt or it cannot be upheld on any reasonable ground.” (quoting Guilford Cty. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Elections, 110 N.C. App. 506, 511, 430 S.E.2d 681, 684–85 
(1993))). 
 40. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	116B-53(c) (stating that “[p]roperty is presumed 
abandoned if it is unclaimed by the apparent owner” over specified periods). 
 41. Rowlette, 188 N.C. App. at 723, 656 S.E.2d at 626. No reason for the plaintiffs’ 
failure to communicate with the institutions that held their property within the time 
necessary to prevent transfer appears in the opinion. 
 42. 454 U.S. 516 (1982); see Rowlette, 188 N.C. App. at 717–20, 656 S.E.2d at 622–24 
(citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 518, 526, 530 (1982)). 
 43. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 518. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Rowlette, 188 N.C. App. at 720, 656 S.E.2d at 624 (quoting Texaco, 454 U.S. at 
530). 
 46. Id. at 720–22, 656 S.E.2d at 624–25 (citing Smolow v. Hafer, 867 A.2d 767 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2005); Smyth v. Carter, 845 N.E.2d 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Hooks v. 
Kennedy, 06-0541 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07); 961 So.2d 425; Sogg v. Ohio Dept. of 
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Plaintiffs sought Supreme Court review, but the court dismissed 
their appeal of right,47 presumably finding that the constitutional 
question was not substantial,48 and denied discretionary review,49 
presumably finding that the case was not significant or that it did not 
involve an important legal principle.50 Pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in In re Civil Penalty, the decision in Rowlette is 
binding on all other panels of the Court of Appeals until overturned 
by a higher court.51 
Had the Supreme Court reviewed Rowlette, it might have noted 
that other courts have found the constitutional question concerning 
interest on unclaimed property to be of great significance. When the 
Ohio Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision that was 
relied on in Rowlette, it declared that the state’s retention of interest 
“strikes at the core of the concept of private property because, at a 
stroke, the [Ohio] General Assembly severed the link between the 
owner of an asset and the income produced by that asset.”52 The Ohio 
Supreme Court distinguished the Ohio Unclaimed Property Act from 
 
Commerce, 2007-Ohio-3219, 2007 WL 1821306 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) rev’d sub nom. Sogg 
v. Zurz, 121 Ohio St.3d 449, 2009-Ohio-1526, 905 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 2009)). At the time the 
decision in Rowlette was filed on February 19, 2008, the appeal in Sogg was pending. See 
Sogg v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 116 Ohio St.3d 1410, 2007-Ohio-6140, 876 N.E.2d 968, 
968 (Ohio 2007) (allowing appeal). On April 8, 2009, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed 
the Ohio Court of Appeals’ decision. Sogg, 121 Ohio St.3d at ¶	16, 905 N.E.2d at 193. 
 47. Rowlette v. State, 362 N.C. 474, 474, 666 S.E.2d 487, 488 (2008). 
 48. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that for there to be an appeal of 
right from a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, the constitutional question 
“must be real and substantial rather than superficial and frivolous” or “a constitutional 
question which has not already been the subject of conclusive judicial determination.” 
State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 305, 163 S.E.2d 376, 383 (1968). Since Rowlette was a case of 
first impression, the appeal of right must have been dismissed on the former ground. The 
United States Supreme Court has held that where the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
has dismissed an appeal of right on a constitutional question, the dismissal is a ruling by 
the state Supreme Court on the merits, thus permitting United States Supreme Court 
review. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Cty., 479 U.S. 130, 138 (1986). However, 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina does not recognize dismissal as a precedent. See 
Jenkins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 324 N.C. 394, 400, 378 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1989) (stating 
that denial of discretionary review has “no value as a precedent”). 
 49. Rowlette, 362 N.C. at 474, 666 S.E.2d at 488. 
 50. See supra note 48 for discussion of dismissals’ precedential value; see also supra 
note 16 (describing instances in which the Supreme Court may allow discretionary 
review). 
 51. See In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) 
(“[A] panel of the Court of Appeals is bound by a prior decision of another panel of the 
same court addressing the same question, but in a different case, unless overturned by an 
intervening decision from a higher court.”). 
 52. Sogg v. Zurz, 121 Ohio St.3d 449, ¶	6, 2009-Ohio-1526, 905 N.E.2d 187, 190 (Ohio 
2009). 
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the statutes of other states because the Ohio statute “does not contain 
a presumption of abandonment.”53  
In a case decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in 2013, Judge Richard Posner, long a leader in the field of law 
and economics,54 held that Indiana’s retention of interest earned on 
unclaimed property was an unconstitutional taking.55 Posner agreed 
with the Ohio Supreme Court that interest is linked to principal: “[I]f 
you own a deposit account that pays interest, you own the interest.”56 
Posner observed that “[a]bandonment of property other than as a 
consequence of death without a valid will or heirs means at common 
law a voluntary relinquishment of ownership” and described the 
presumption of abandonment in many unclaimed property acts a 
“misunderstanding of the concept of abandonment.”57  
Following Rowlette, any subsequent constitutional challenge to 
North Carolina’s retention of interest on unclaimed personal property 
would necessarily be rejected by the lower courts. Only a very 
determined and well-resourced plaintiff would commence such a 
challenge in the hope that the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
would hear an appeal from the inevitable, unanimous adverse 
judgment in the Court of Appeals.58 As a practical matter, the three-
 
 53. Id. at ¶	9, 905 N.E.2d at 190–91 (quoting Sogg v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 2007-
Ohio-3219, 2007 WL 1821306, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) rev’d sub nom. Sogg, 121 Ohio 
St.3d 449, 2009-Ohio-1526, 905 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 2009)). 
 54. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, LAW PROFESSORS: THREE CENTURIES OF SHAPING 
AMERICAN LAW 299–300 (2017) (“Posner is generally credited with the invention or at 
least the popularization of Law and Economics, the jurisprudential strain within American 
Legal Education that argued that American law in general, and the American common 
law in particular, was best understood as the application of cost-benefit analysis to social 
problems, in a search for the best means of wealth maximization or efficiency.”) Joining in 
Posner’s opinion was Judge Frank Easterbrook, Cerajeski v. Zoeller, 735 F.3d 577, 578 
(7th Cir. 2013), a jurist also noted for his use of economic analysis of law. See generally 
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991) (applying economic and legal doctrines to “conclude that 
corporate law has an economic structure [which] increases the wealth of all by supplying 
the rules that investors would select if it were easy to contract more fully”). 
 55. Cerajeski, 735 F.3d. at 580. 
 56. Id. The concept is hardly original. See Beckford v. Tobin (1749) 27 Eng. Rep. 
1049, 1051; 1 Ves. Sen. 308, 310 (“[I]nterest shall follow the principal, as the shadow the 
body.”). Posner admitted that “[t]he state can charge a fee for custodianship and for 
searching for the owner, but the interest on the principal in a bank account is not a fee for 
those services.” Cerajeski, 735 F.3d. at 583. 
 57. Cerajeski, 735 F.3d at 582. For a discussion of unclaimed property acts, see JOHN 
V. ORTH, REAPPRAISALS IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY 78–82 (2010). 
 58. For an example of such a “deep pocketed plaintiff,” see the discussion of Duke 
Energy Carolinas v. Gray, infra notes 207–15 and accompanying text. 
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judge panel of the Court of Appeals made the final decision in a case 
that concerned the constitutional protection of property. 
II.  TENANT ABANDONMENT—LANDLORD’S DUTY TO 
MITIGATE—WAIVER BY TENANT 
In 2006, in Sylva Shops Limited Partnership v. Hibbard,59 a 
panel of the Court of Appeals held that a clause in a commercial 
lease in which a tenant waives the landlord’s duty to mitigate 
damages in a case of tenant abandonment is not contrary to public 
policy and is enforceable. 
In Sylva Shops, Defendants entered into a five-year lease in 
Plaintiff’s shopping center to operate a restaurant.60 Within six 
months, the business failed, leaving four and a half years remaining 
on the lease.61 Plaintiff made some effort to find a replacement 
tenant62 but refused to reduce the rent below that originally agreed to 
by Defendants, and months passed before a new tenant was found.63 
Plaintiff sued for unpaid rent and relied on a lease provision that 
“Landlord shall have no obligations to mitigate Tenant’s damages by 
reletting the Demised Premises.”64 Holding the proviso invalid, the 
superior court judge ordered a trial to determine the amount of 
damages that Plaintiff could have avoided by proper acts in 
mitigation, and reduced Plaintiff’s recovery to that extent.65 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding Defendants liable for 
the entire amount, without offset.66 The court began its analysis by 
implicitly recognizing that a lease is a contract, quoting an earlier 
 
 59. 175 N.C. App. 423, 623 S.E.2d 785 (2006). 
 60. Id. at 424, 623 S.E.2d at 787–88. 
 61. Id. at 424, 623 S.E.2d at 788. 
 62. Id. Plaintiff’s leasing agent “placed a ‘For Lease’ sign in the window of the space, 
sent mailings to national tenants, and called other local businesses about leasing the 
space.” Id.  
 63. Id. Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s failure to find a replacement tenant resulted 
from its “unwillingness to agree to a lower rent.” Id. 
 64. Id. at 424, 426, 623 S.E.2d at 788–89. A contractual waiver of the duty to mitigate 
should be distinguished from the waiver that occurs when a defendant fails to assert at 
trial the affirmative defense of the duty to mitigate. See Jacqueline Sandler, Note, Waiving 
the Duty to Mitigate in Commercial Leases, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 647, 649 n.4 
(2014). Although commonly referred to as a duty to mitigate damages, no true duty is 
involved, in the sense that failure to mitigate is actionable. In fact, failure to mitigate simply 
offsets the landlord’s damages to the extent of value received, or that could by reasonable 
efforts have been received. See Stephanie G. Flynn, Duty to Mitigate Damages Upon a 
Tenant’s Abandonment, 34 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 721, 724 (2000). 
 65. Sylva Shops, 175 N.C. App. at 424, 623 S.E.2d at 787. 
 66. Id. at 433, 623 S.E.2d at 787. 
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Supreme Court of North Carolina opinion: “Liberty to contract 
carries with it the right to exercise poor judgment as well as good 
judgment. It is the simple law of contracts that as a man consents to 
bind himself, so shall he be bound.”67 It then acknowledged that 
North Carolina has adopted from contract law the duty of mitigation 
of damages in all leases, commercial as well as residential.68 
Nonetheless, reverting to the principle of freedom of contract, the 
court held that it was not contrary to public policy to contract away 
that duty in commercial leases,69 analogizing it to a contract 
exculpating a person from the results of ordinary negligence.70 The 
court cited appellate court cases allowing waiver of the duty to 
mitigate from appellate courts in Arkansas, New York, Ohio, and 
Texas,71 while recognizing that the Texas decision had been 
superseded by statute.72 The Court of Appeals also recognized that a 
federal district court predicted that New Jersey would not enforce a 
covenant in a lease waiving the duty to mitigate.73 
Although Defendants in Sylva Shops did not argue that the 
provision against mitigation was the product of unequal bargaining 
power, the court clearly would not have been receptive to that 
argument given its observation that in commercial leases there is 
“relatively equal bargaining power due to the availability of other 
 
 67. Id. at 427, 623 S.E.2d at 789 (quoting Troitino v. Goodman, 225 N.C. 406, 414, 35 
S.E.2d 277, 283 (1945)). 
 68. Id. at 427, 623 S.E.2d at 789–90 (quoting Isbey v. Crews, 55 N.C. App. 47, 51, 284 
S.E.2d 534, 537 (1981)). 
 69. Id. at 424, 623 S.E.2d at 787. 
 70. Id. at 428–29, 623 S.E.2d at 790. However, the court in Sylva Shops emphasized 
“that this opinion does not address the viability of such a clause in a residential lease, 
which presents an entirely different situation.” Id. at 429, 623 S.E.2d at 791. 
 71. Id. at 430, 623 S.E.2d at 791 (citing Weingarten/Arkansas, Inc. v. ABC Interstate 
Theatres, Inc., 811 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Ark. 1991); Comar Babylon Co. v. Goldberg, 497 
N.Y.S.2d 405 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); New Towne Ltd. P’ship v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc., 
680 N.E.2d 644, 647 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades 
Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 299 (Tex. 1997)). 
 72. Id. (citing Lunsford Consulting Grp. v. Crescent Real Estate Funding VIII, 77 
S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002)); see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §	91.006(a)–(b) 
(West 2016, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“A landlord has a duty to mitigate 
damages if a tenant abandons the leased premises in violation of the lease. A provision of 
a lease that purports to waive a right or to exempt a landlord from a liability or duty under 
this section is void.”).  
 73. Sylva Shops, 175 N.C. App. at 430, 623 S.E.2d at 791 (citing Drutman Realty Co. 
v. Jindo Corp., 865 F.Supp. 1093 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding under New Jersey law that 
parties to a commercial lease may not contract to relieve the landlord of its duty to 
mitigate under New Jersey law)). 
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space and the fact that neither party is compelled to make a deal.”74 
Nor did the court find it relevant that the lease also included a 
covenant against tenant transfer by assignment or sublease without 
the landlord’s prior written consent, which consent could be withheld 
in the landlord’s “sole discretion.”75 “This Court has previously 
upheld such clauses [against tenant transfer without landlord’s 
consent] even when they do not place any limitations on the 
landlord’s ability to withhold consent to an assignment of the lease.”76 
The court’s decision in Sylva Shops was not reviewed by the Supreme 
Court: Defendants did not petition for discretionary review, and the 
Supreme Court did not exercise its discretion to take the case on its 
own motion.77 
Although not a constitutional decision like Rowlette, Sylva Shops 
was probably of more immediate practical consequence. Without a 
contrary decision by a higher court, the precedent it set was 
necessarily followed the next year in Kotis Properties, Inc. v. Casey’s, 
Inc.,78 which also went unreviewed by the Supreme Court. Authors of 
an influential treatise on North Carolina property law promptly 
advised lawyers for commercial landlords to include provisions in their 
standard leases that “limit[] mitigation requirements in the event of a 
tenant’s breach,”79 while small business owners were cautioned to 
“strive—in spite of unequal bargaining power—to require some 
reasonable mitigation requirements of lessors.”80 
Right or wrong, the decision in Sylva Shops would have 
benefitted from Supreme Court review.81 While Defendants could 
 
 74. Id. at 429, 623 S.E.2d at 791. 
 75. Id. at 430–31, 623 S.E.2d at 791–92. 
 76. Id. at 431, 623 S.E.2d at 792 (citing Isbey v. Crews, 55 N.C. App. 47, 49, 284 S.E.2d 
534, 536 (1981)). 
 77. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §	7A-31(a) (2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court may, in 
its discretion, on motion of any party to the cause or on its own motion, certify the cause 
for review by the Supreme Court, either before or after it has been determined by the 
Court of Appeals.”). 
 78. 183 N.C. App. 617, 624, 645 S.E.2d 138, 142–43 (2007) (citing Sylva Shops, 175 
N.C. App. at 432, 623 S.E.2d at 792). 
 79. See JAMES A. WEBSTER, JR., WEBSTER’S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH 
CAROLINA §	12.28, p. 12-67 (Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr. eds., 6th ed. 
Supp. 2016). 
 80. Id. 
 81. One commentator has argued that the Arkansas and New York cases, relied on by 
the Court of Appeals are not directly on point. Sandler, supra note 64, at 655 n.55, 657 
n.63. That commentator points out that Weingarten/Arkansas, Inc. “was decided mostly 
within the context of a surrender clause, so its wider applicability is limited .	.	.	.” Id. at 657, 
n.55. She also argues that Comar Babylon Co. must be placed in the context of 
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certainly have refused Plaintiff’s lease and gone elsewhere, it is 
questionable that the parties had “relatively equal bargaining 
power.”82 Plaintiff was a Wal-Mart shopping center,83 while 
Defendants were small business owners.84 Critics of the decision have 
contended that the rule governing residential leases should be 
extended to commercial leases, arguing that “[t]here should be little or 
no distinction between treatment of residential leases (where the duty 
to mitigate cannot be waived) and commercial leases involving ‘mom-
and-pop’ tenants.”85 Of course, not all commercial tenants lack 
bargaining power: grocery store chains or large department stores may 
have more bargaining power than operators of single malls or shopping 
centers.86 The difficulty of calibrating a rule depending on bargaining 
power has led one commentator to advocate a “blanket rule” rendering 
all such provisions void.87 
Perhaps more significant is the societal interest in avoiding 
economic waste when premises are left unoccupied. It is precisely this 
concern that led to the adoption of a duty to mitigate in contract law on 
the ground that damages should be compensatory rather than punitive. 
As leases came to be seen as contractual, the duty from contract law 
was adopted into property law.88 However, commercial leases raise 
issues specific to the real estate market,89 some of them demonstrated 
in Sylva Shops. If landlords are held to a duty to mitigate, how 
aggressively must they seek a replacement tenant? Must landlords 
accept offers to rent for less than the amount in the abandoning 
tenant’s lease?90 And does the contract theory of anticipatory breach91 
 
disagreement among New York courts over whether the duty to mitigate applies to 
commercial landlords. Id. at 657 n.63. 
 82. See Sylva Shops, 175 N.C. App. 423, 429, 623 S.E.2d 785, 791 (2006). 
 83. Id. at 424, 623 S.E.2d 785 at 787–88. 
 84. Id. at 424, 623 S.E.2d 785 at 787 (identifying Defendants as “Loanne G. Hibbard, 
Stanley L. Hibbard, and Linda Gedney”). 
 85. WEBSTER, JR., supra note 79, §	12.28, p. 12-67. 
 86. See, e.g., Piggly Wiggly S., Inc. v. Heard, 405 S.E.2d 478, 479 (Ga. 1991) (involving 
a tenant grocery store that drafted the lease and a landlord that agreed to construct a 
building for the tenant according to the tenant’s plans). 
 87. See Sandler, supra note 64, at 668–71. 
 88. For a critical discussion of the concept that a lease is “like any other contract,” see 
ORTH, supra note 57, at 47–55. 
 89. A lease is a conveyance as well as a contract. See, e.g., Strader v. Sunstates Corp., 
129 N.C. App. 562, 570, 500 S.E.2d 752, 756 (1998) (“A lease is a contract which contains 
both property rights and contractual rights.”). 
 90. On the one hand, the rent from the replacement tenant plus the damages owed by 
the abandoning tenant (if collectable) would make the landlord whole. On the other hand, 
a reduction of the rent for the replacement tenant would put downward pressure on rent 
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also apply to the damages calculation if the tenant abandons years 
before the expiration of the lease? These are questions the Supreme 
Court could have answered had it reviewed the case. 
The interaction between ex ante waiver of the landlord’s duty to 
mitigate and the covenant against tenant transfer without consent, 
particularly if consent could be refused arbitrarily, deserved further 
review. The Court of Appeals in Sylva Shops simply cited a 1981 Court 
of Appeals decision holding that, in the absence of a provision that 
consent would not be unreasonably withheld, the landlord’s decision 
could be based on “arbitrary considerations of personal taste, 
sensibility, or convenience.”92 The issue is unsettled elsewhere.93 The 
Second Restatement of Property adopts the position that “the 
landlord’s consent to an alienation by the tenant cannot be withheld 
unreasonably,”94 while acknowledging that this is the “minority view.”95 
In England, there is a presumption that consent to assigning or 
subleasing may not be unreasonably refused.96 Without the ability to 
transfer the tenancy or to require mitigation, a tenant whose business 
has failed is left with few options other than bankruptcy.97 
 
for comparable property and might adversely affect other tenants in the landlord’s 
property. 
 91. See Anticipatory Breach, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A breach 
of contract caused by a party’s anticipatory repudiation, i.e., unequivocally indicating that 
the party will not perform when performance is due. Under these circumstances, the 
nonbreaching party may elect to treat the repudiation as an immediate breach and sue for 
damages.”) 
 92. Isbey v. Crews, 55 N.C. App. 47, 49, 284 S.E.2d 534, 536–37 (1981); see also Sylva 
Shops Ltd. P’ship v. Hibbard, 175 N.C. App. 423, 431, 623 S.E.2d 785, 792 (2006). Isbey was 
decided before In re Civil Penalty and was not reviewed by the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina. 
 93. See Dick Broad. Co. v. Oak Ridge FM, 395 S.W.3d 653, 656–57, 665–66 (Tenn. 2013) 
(surveying recent decisions on the subject before rejecting Isbey and adopting “the ‘modern’ 
position .	.	. imposing an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in interpreting a silent 
consent clause”). 
 94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT §	15.2(2) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977). The ultimate issue is not whether a particular reason is reasonable or not, but 
whose idea of reasonableness should prevail: that of the landlord or of the legal finder of 
fact. 
 95. Id. §	15.2 reporter’s note 1; see also Brent C. Shaffer, Sublease Due Diligence, 17 
PROB. & PROP. 44, 50 (2003) (“[C]ase law .	.	. in a slight minority of jurisdictions implies that 
the prime landlord’s consent [to tenant transfer] can not [sic] be unreasonably withheld, 
unless there is express language setting forth a stronger standard for consent.”) (citing 
Landlord & Tenant Act 1927). 
 96. See WILLIAM GELDART, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 81 (D.C.M. Yardley 
ed., 9th ed. 1984). 
 97. Defendants in Sylva Shops had petitioned for bankruptcy. Sylva Shops Ltd. P’ship 
v. Hibbard, 175 N.C. App. 423, 425 n.1, 623 S.E.2d 785, 788, n.1 (2006). 
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III.  THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES—OPTIONS IN LEASES 
In 2012, in New Bar Partnership v. Martin,98 a panel of the 
Court of Appeals held that the common law Rule Against 
Perpetuities applies to a right of first refusal in a lease. 
In 1988, Landlord leased commercial property to Tenant for a 
five-year term with an option to renew the lease for three additional 
five-year terms. The lease also granted Tenant an option to purchase99 
during the first five-year term and a right of first refusal to purchase100 
during any subsequent five-year term if the option to renew was 
exercised.101 Before the expiration of the first five-year term, Tenant, 
with Landlord’s consent, transferred to an Assignee all its interest in 
the lease, including Tenant’s option to renew and right of first 
refusal.102 At the same time, Landlord granted Assignee an option to 
renew the lease for two additional five-year terms.103 In 2002, 
Landlord extended Assignee’s option to renew for two additional 
five-year terms.104 In 2004, Landlord transferred title to the property 
to Landlord’s son (“Trustee”) to hold in a family trust.105 In 2010, 
Trustee transferred title to a limited liability corporation (“LLC”) 
with himself as manager thereof.106 As manager, he entered into a 
contract of sale with Purchaser to close in 2011.107 Assignee, then in its 
fifth five-year term, brought an action against the LLC and Purchaser 
 
 98. 221 N.C. App. 302, 729 S.E.2d 675 (2012). 
 99. Id. at 305, 729 S.E.2d at 679. “An option creates in the optionee a power to 
compel the owner of property to sell it at a stipulated price whether or not he be willing to 
part with ownership.” 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §	26.64 (A. James Casner ed., 
1952). 
 100. New Bar P’ship, 221 N.C. App. at 305, 729 S.E.2d at 679. A right of first refusal, 
also known as a pre-emptive right, is a specific type of option to purchase. “The most 
common right of first refusal becomes operative when the landlord receives an offer to 
purchase the leased property from a third party. If the landlord decides to sell, he must 
first offer the property to the tenant upon the terms of the third party’s bid.” ROBERT S. 
SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT §	9:9 (1980). 
 101. New Bar P’ship, 221 N.C. App. at 305, 729 S.E.2d at 679. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. By the terms of the agreement with Assignee, renewal was automatic, unless 
Assignee served notice otherwise. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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to enforce Assignee’s right of first refusal.108 The superior court 
dismissed the action.109 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the 
right of first refusal violated the common law Rule Against 
Perpetuities, so was void ab initio.110 In its classic form, the Rule 
Against Perpetuities provides: “No interest is good unless it must 
vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being 
at the creation of the interest.”111 North Carolina applied the common 
law Rule Against Perpetuities until 1995,112 when the General 
Assembly adopted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities 
(USRAP),113 providing that an interest is good if it must vest either 
within the period of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities or if 
it actually vests within ninety years of its creation.114 USRAP 
expressly excludes “nondonative transfers,”115 apparently leaving the 
common law Rule Against Perpetuities in effect as to interests 
created by such transfers. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 
right of first refusal in New Bar was created in 1993116 and remained 
potentially exercisable until 2028, assuming all seven options to renew 
 
 108. Id. at 305–306, 729 S.E.2d at 679. 
 109. Id. at 304, 729 S.E.2d at 678. New Bar involved several other issues that 
contributed to the dismissal, see id., but this Article is concerned only with the holding 
regarding the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
 110. Id. at 314, 729 S.E.2d at 685. 
 111. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §	201, at 191 (Roland 
Gray ed., 4th ed. 1942).  
 112. For information on how the common law Rule Against Perpetuities was applied 
before the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities was adopted, see generally 
Ronald K. Link, The Rule Against Perpetuities in North Carolina, 57 N.C. L. REV. 727 
(1979) (collecting and analyzing North Carolina cases regarding the Rule Against 
Perpetuities). 
 113. Act of June 7, 1995, ch. 190, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 346 (codified as amended at 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§	41-15 to -22 (2016)). For a discussion of the statute, see generally 
Ronald K. Link & Kimberly A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Carolina: The 
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers, and Honorary Trusts, 
74 N.C. L. REV. 1783, 1789–1800 (1996). 
 114. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	41-15 (2015). The second prong of USRAP allows what is 
commonly called a ninety year wait-and-see period for the validity of remote unvested 
interests. Id. 
 115. §	41-18. 
 116. New Bar P’ship v. Martin, 221 N.C. App. 302, 314, 729 S.E.2d at 675, 685 (2012) 
(“[T]he right of first refusal was created on 15 December 1993 when the lease was 
renewed .	.	.	.”). Actually, the right of first refusal was created in the 1988 lease, but did not 
become exercisable until 1993, when the first option to renew was exercised. Id. at 304, 729 
S.E.2d at 679. The perpetuities period begins to run when an option becomes exercisable. 
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the lease were exercised.117 Because no life in being in 1993 was 
implicated in the lease, the right of first refusal could only be valid 
under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities if it had to vest, if at 
all, not later than twenty-one years after its creation.118 Although the 
action was filed in 2011—within twenty-one years of 1993—the 
interest was still held invalid because the common law Rule is “a rule 
of logical proof[;]” for an interest to be valid it must appear at its 
creation that it must necessarily vest, if at all, within the perpetuities 
period.119 Review by the Supreme Court was not sought, and the court 
did not take the case on its own motion.120 
In 2015, in the absence of an intervening contrary decision by a 
higher court, New Bar was followed in Khwaja v. Khan.121 The court 
in Khwaja acknowledged that  
 
 
 117. Id. at 314, 729 S.E.2d at 685. At the time the complaint in New Bar was filed in 
2011, four options to renew had been exercised: in 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008. Id. at 304, 
729 S.E.2d at 679. Options to renew a lease are not subject to the common law Rule 
Against Perpetuities. GRAY, supra note 111, §	230, at 231 (“It is no objection to a lease 
that it contains [a covenant for renewal], if the entire control of the covenant is in the 
hands of those persons who have vested interests under the lease.”). By contrast, rights of 
first refusal in a lease are subject to the common law Rule Against Perpetuities because, 
while “the present interest is a tenancy for years .	.	.	[,] the interest to be purchased is a 
fee.” Id. §	230.3, at 234 (“An option to a tenant for years to purchase the fee, exercisable 
at a remote time, is bad as violating the Rule [A]gainst Perpetuities.”). 
 118. Options and rights of first refusal that are exercisable only by optionees living at 
their creation are valid under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. See, e.g., Gore v. 
Beren, 867 P.2d 330, 341 (Kan. 1994) (finding no violation of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities because the right of first refusal was personal to the parties and did not run to 
successors in interest, even though agreements creating an option or preemptive right to 
purchase real estate are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities). Where a right of first 
refusal could be exercised by the optionee’s “heirs and assigns” beyond twenty-one years 
after the optionee’s death, the common law Rule is clearly violated. See, e.g., Low v. 
Spellman, 629 A.2d 57, 58–59 (Me. 1993) (reaffirmed by Pew v. Sayler, 2015 ME 120 at 
¶	22, 123 A.3d 522, 529 (Me. 2015)); see also Khwaja v. Khan, 239 N.C. App. 87, 92–93, 767 
S.E.2d 901, 904–05 (2015), disc. rev. denied, 772 S.E.2d 724 (N.C. 2015) (holding a right of 
first refusal “binding upon and insures [sic] to the benefit of the heirs [and] successors in 
interest to the parties” invalid under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities 
(alterations in original)). 
 119. JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 882 
(9th ed. 2013) (describing the common law Rule Against Perpetuities as “a rule of logical 
proof”). 
 120. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §	7A-31(a) (2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court may, in 
its discretion, on motion of any party to the cause or on its own motion, certify the cause 
for review by the Supreme Court, either before or after it has been determined by the 
Court of Appeals.”). 
 121. 239 N.C. App. 87, 767 S.E.2d 901 (2015). 
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[t]he parties’ arguments in their briefs raise a number of 
interesting issues .	.	.	. However, we do not reach any of these 
issues. Rather based on our holding in New Bar .	.	.	, we are 
compelled to conclude that the Lease provision granting the 
Tenant a preemptive right violates the common law rule 
against perpetuities and is, therefore, void and 
unenforceable.122  
 
One judge concurred reluctantly in the result, “writ[ing] separately to 
express [her] concern that [the court] should proceed with caution in 
applying the common law [Rule Against Perpetuities] to non-
donative transfers .	.	.	.”123 But the panel of the Court of Appeals that 
heard Khwaja had no opportunity to proceed in any other way than 
to follow the precedent set by New Bar.124 Because Khwaja was 
decided unanimously, there was no automatic right of appeal, and a 
petition for discretionary review was denied.125 
The common law Rule Against Perpetuities can raise famously 
complicated questions. Even the leading authority on the Rule 
admitted that its study was “a constant school of modesty.”126 
Although significant aspects of perpetuities law have been altered in 
the last two decades, the Rule remains a residual source of problems, 
as shown by New Bar. It is noteworthy that at the time the General 
Assembly adopted USRAP in 1995, it also adopted several 
companion statutes, including one limiting a right of first refusal in 
gross to 30 years.127 A right of first refusal in gross is one in which the 
holder of the right does not own any other interest in the land that is 
subject to the right.128 While this still would not have saved a right of 
 
 122. Id. at 90, 767 S.E.2d at 903. 
 123. Id. at 93, 767 S.E.2d at 905 (Bryant, J., concurring). 
 124. Id. at 90, 767 S.E.2d at 903 (majority opinion) (deciding that the court was 
“compelled to conclude” that the lease in question violated the Rule Against 
Perpetuities). 
 125. Khwaja v. Khan, 772 S.E.2d 724, 724 (N.C. 2015). 
 126. GRAY, supra note 111, at xi. 
 127. Act of July 29, 1995, ch. 525, §	41-29, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1911, 1912 (codified at 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§	41-28 to -33 (2015)) (“An option in gross with respect to an interest in 
land or a preemptive right in the nature of a right of first refusal in gross with respect to an 
interest in land becomes invalid if it is not actually exercised within 30 years after its 
creation.”). Other sections adopted in 1995 allow a thirty year wait-and-see period for 
leases to commence in the future, §	41-30, and for unvested easements, §	41-31. For a 
discussion of these statutes, see Link & Licata, supra note 113, at 1800–05. 
 128. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	41-28(3) (2015) (“	‘Preemptive right in the nature of a right of 
first refusal in gross with respect to an interest in land’ means a preemptive right in which 
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first refusal in a lease that had a theoretical life of thirty-five years, it 
indicates a legislative willingness to abandon the common law Rule 
Against Perpetuities in nondonative transfers. Rights of first refusal 
in leases are arguably less objectionable than such rights unrelated to 
other interests in the land—that is, rights in gross. “[T]he option in 
gross tends to discourage the development of land by the holder of 
the possessory interest, whereas the option held by one who is also 
lessee tends to encourage the development of the land by the lessee-
optionee.”129 Given those incentives, it is ironic that an option in gross 
is valid for thirty years, but an option in a lease exercisable for the 
same period is void ab initio.130 
If the Supreme Court had exercised its discretion sua sponte to 
grant review of the Court of Appeals decision in New Bar, it could 
have considered whether the lower court had misapplied the common 
law Rule Against Perpetuities. Rather than find that the right of first 
refusal continued beyond the perpetuities period, the Supreme Court 
could have recognized that the right was tied to the option to renew 
the lease. The right would never have been exercisable at all if the 
assignee had not exercised the option to renew the lease at the end of 
the first five-year term in 1993. In this view, the right of first refusal in 
New Bar was not one continuous right, but a series of successive 
rights that arose each time the lease was renewed. Therefore, the 
right that arose in 1993 expired unexercised in 1998. Repeated 
renewals of the lease made successive rights of first refusal 
exercisable. Each one would fail within five years if unexercised. On 
this view, the assignee in New Bar was attempting to enforce the right 
of first refusal that became exercisable in 2008 and that would expire 
in 2013. 
Rather than—or in addition to—reviewing whether the Rule had 
been properly applied by the Court of Appeals in New Bar, the 
Supreme Court could have considered whether the common law Rule 
Against Perpetuities should continue to apply to a right of first refusal 
in a lease if it could not be exercised beyond the lease term. Other 
 
the holder of the preemptive right does not own any leasehold or other interest in the land 
which is the subject of the preemptive right.”). 
 129. THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES AND FUTURE 
INTERESTS 207 (2d ed. 1984). 
 130. A right of first refusal in gross with a stated duration of more than thirty years is 
not void ab initio, but void only “if it is not actually exercised within thirty years after its 
creation.” §	41-29. The right of first refusal in the lease in New Bar would have expired in 
2023, thirty years after 1993, if the final option to renew the lease were not exercised in 
that year. See id. 
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states permit such rights even under the common law Rule Against 
Perpetuities.131 The Supreme Court could also have considered 
whether the common law Rule should continue to apply to 
commercial transactions in general. Prominent commentators have 
advocated the abandonment of the Rule in nondonative transfers: 
“the rule against perpetuities is obviously not suited to the 
commercial transaction. The rule against perpetuities was formulated 
in the context of donative transfers of family wealth. Lives in being 
plus twenty-one years has no purpose in the commercial field.”132 
“The concept of remote vesting designed for future interests does not 
easily or predictably apply to contract rights created by business 
organizations.”133 Courts in other jurisdictions have declined to apply 
the Rule “where its purposes will not be served,”134 and some have 
found the adoption of USRAP a significant indicator of a change in 
public policy concerning perpetuities.135 Of course, these issues of 
general jurisprudential significance could not have been considered 
by the Court of Appeals because they would involve overruling 
earlier cases,136 something only the Supreme Court can do. 
IV.  THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES—PERPETUAL PRIVATE 
NONCHARITABLE TRUSTS 
In 2010, in Brown Brothers Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson,137 a 
panel of the Court of Appeals held that legislation allowing perpetual 
private noncharitable trusts was constitutional. 
 
 131. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. §	36-1-24 (West 2016, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. 
Sess. (excluding HB 2459)); Wing, Inc. v. Arnold, 107 So.2d 765, 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1958); Keogh v. Peck, 147 N.E. 266, 271–72 (Ill. 1925); Quarto Mining Co. v. Litman, 326 
N.E.2d 676, 681 (Ohio 1975). 
 132. BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 129, at 207–08. 
 133. Link & Licata, supra note 113, at 1800. 
 134. Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc., 345 P.3d 1040, 
1043 (Nev. 2015) (concerning an area-of-interest mineral royalty); see also Rich, Rich, & 
Nance v. Carolina Constr. Corp., 35 N.C. 190, 194, 558 S.E.2d 77, 80 (2002) (“Commercial 
transactions that do not violate the underlying policies behind the rule against perpetuities 
.	.	. do not fit under the umbrella of the common law rule.”) (dictum). 
 135. Juliano & Sons Enter.’s., Inc. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 593 A.2d 814, 815 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (refusing to apply the common law Rule Against Perpetuities 
to nondonative commercial transfers because the USRAP “abolishes the common law and 
embodies the State’s entire law on the rule”). 
 136. See, e.g., Vill. of Pinehurst v. Reg’l Inv. of Moore, Inc., 330 N.C. 725, 729, 412 
S.E.2d 645, 646–47 (1995); Smith v. Mitchell, 301 N.C. 58, 66–67, 269 S.E.2d 608, 613 
(1980). 
 137. 202 N.C. App. 283, 688 S.E.2d 752 (2010), disc. rev. denied, 364 N.C. 239, 698 
S.E.2d 391 (2010). In an article written before the Benson litigation, I questioned the 
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On November 27, 2007, Settlor transferred property to Trustee 
in trust138 for the benefit of Settlor’s three then-living children for 
their lives, then to Settlor’s unborn and unascertained heirs for their 
lives, generation after generation forever.139 Trustee was given a 
present power of sale with respect to the trust property.140 Perpetual 
private noncharitable trusts first became possible in North Carolina in 
August 2007 when the General Assembly amended USRAP to allow 
future interests in trusts to remain unvested in perpetuity, if the 
trustee has a power of sale over trust assets exercisable within twenty-
one years of some life in being at the creation of the interest.141 The 
living beneficiaries claimed that by allowing perpetual private 
noncharitable trusts, the statute violated the North Carolina 
Constitution’s prohibition of perpetuities:142 “[p]erpetuities and 
monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and shall not be 
allowed.”143 This, they argued, prohibited the state from abandoning 
or modifying the common law Rule Against Perpetuities.144 The living 
beneficiaries demanded that Trustee immediately terminate the trust 
and distribute the assets to them.145 In response, Trustee brought 
action against Settlor and the beneficiaries and moved for summary 
judgment, seeking a declaration concerning the constitutionality of 
 
constitutionality of the 2007 amendments to USRAP. John V. Orth, Allowing Perpetuities 
in North Carolina, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 399, 409–10 (2009). I do not intend to re-argue 
the point here; rather I include Benson in this Article as an example of a significant 
property issue resolved by a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals and unreviewed by 
the Supreme Court. 
 138. It does not appear in the facts whether the Benson Trust is a revocable or an 
irrevocable trust. Trusts created in North Carolina after January 1, 2006 are revocable 
unless expressly made irrevocable. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	36C-6-602 (2015). 
 139. Benson, 202 N.C. App. at 284, 688 S.E.2d at 753. In addition to Settlor’s heirs, 
Settlor’s sister was also named a contingent beneficiary. Id. The quality of her interest and 
the condition precedent to its vesting is not described. Id. 
 140. Id. at 284, 688 S.E.2d at 753–54. It is not stated whether the beneficiaries’ interests 
are subject to a restraint on alienation (a spendthrift provision). See id. 
 141. Act of August 19, 2007, ch. 41, §	1, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 390 (codified as amended 
at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	41-23(e) (2015)). Alternatively, unvested remote remainder interests 
in trusts are allowable “if there exists an unlimited power to terminate the trust in one or 
more persons in being.” Id. 
 142. Benson, 202 N.C. App. at 284, 688 S.E.2d at 754. 
 143. N.C. CONST. art. I, §	34. This provision has been part of the North Carolina 
Constitution since 1776. See ORTH & NEWBY, supra note 5, at 11, 90–91. 
 144. Benson, 202 N.C. App. at 288, 688 S.E.2d at 756. According to the living 
beneficiaries, “North Carolina courts have recognized the common law rule against 
perpetuities, and specifically, its restriction of the remote vesting of future interests, as 
constitutionally required to preserve the alienability of property.” Id. 
 145. Id. at 284, 688 S.E.2d at 754. One of the living beneficiaries represented the two 
other living beneficiaries who were minors. See id. at 285 n.3, 688 S.E.2d at 754 n.3. 
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the 2007 statute.146 The superior court upheld the constitutionality of 
the statute and granted Trustee’s motion for summary judgment, 
allowing Trustee to administer the trust according to its terms.147 All 
parties other than Settlor joined in a petition for discretionary review 
by the Supreme Court prior to determination by the Court of 
Appeals, but the petition was denied.148 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the superior 
court.149 Recognizing that the Benson Trust was “intended to be 
perpetual,”150 the court framed the “sole issue” on appeal to be 
“whether the North Carolina Constitution requires application of the 
common law rule against perpetuities’ restriction of the remote 
vesting of future interests in property.”151 The court concluded “it did 
not.”152 In support, the court traced the history of the constitutional 
provision that prohibits perpetuities to the state’s first Declaration of 
Rights in 1776153 and concluded that the provision was linked to 
another provision in the 1776 Constitution requiring “[t]hat the future 
Legislature of this State shall regulate entails, in such manner as to 
prevent perpetuities.”154 Obeying the constitutional command, in 
1784, the General Assembly converted present estates in tail into 
 
 146. Id. at 284–85, 688 S.E.2d at 754. Settlor joined in Trustee’s motion, as did her 
sister, a contingent beneficiary, and Settlor’s unborn heirs. Id. at 283, 688 S.E.2d at 752. 
 147. Id. at 285, 688 S.E.2d at 754. The case was heard by Albert Diaz, Special Superior 
Court Judge for Complex Business Cases. Id. 
 148. Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, 684 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. 2009) (denying 
discretionary review); see N.C. GEN. STAT. §	7A-31(a) (2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court may, 
in its discretion, on motion of any party to the cause or on its own motion, certify the cause 
for review by the Supreme Court, either before or after it has been determined by the 
Court of Appeals.”). 
 149. Benson, 202 N.C. App. at 291, 688 S.E.2d at 752. 
 150. Id. at 284, 688 S.E.2d at 753. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 287, 688 S.E.2d at 755; see N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, §	23. 
For a discussion of this section of the 1776 Declaration of Rights, see John V. Orth, Does 
the Fee Tail Exist in North Carolina? 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 778–86 (1988); see 
also Joshua C. Tate, Perpetuities and the Genius of a Free State, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1823, 
1830–33 (2014). 
 154. N.C. CONST. of 1776, §	43. The Constitution of 1776 comprises two separate 
documents with their own section numbers: the “Declaration of Rights” and the 
“Constitution.” Id. This provision was not carried forward in the North Carolina 
Constitution of 1868 or in the current Constitution adopted in 1970 effective January 1, 
1971. See generally N.C. CONST.; N.C. CONST. of 1868. Entails, or estates in fee tail, are 
estates of indefinite duration, limited to pass only to descendants of the first taker. For a 
discussion of the history of the fee tail, see Orth, supra note 153, at 767–78. 
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estates in fee simple.155 The Court of Appeals concluded that “the 
North Carolina Constitution’s prohibition of perpetuities prohibits 
unreasonable restraints on alienation without requiring a rule 
specifying a time period within which a future interest must vest.”156 
The 2007 statute, therefore, did not violate the North Carolina 
Constitution because the prohibition applies only to restraints on 
alienation of trust property. Since Trustee in Benson had a present 
power of sale with respect to the trust property, the court held that 
the beneficiaries’ future interests that remained unvested for an 
indefinite period of time were not unconstitutional perpetuities.157 
The living beneficiaries filed notice of appeal and petitioned for 
discretionary review, but the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal,158 
presumably finding that the constitutional question was not 
substantial,159 and denied discretionary review, presumably finding 
that the case was not significant or did not involve an important legal 
principle.160 Perhaps surprised by this result, Trustee filed an 
extraordinary motion asking the court to issue a per curiam order 
affirming the holding of the Court of Appeals, and the living 
beneficiaries filed extraordinary motions asking the court to vacate 
the order dismissing their appeal and to treat their appeal as raising a 
 
 155. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	41-1 (2015) (“Every person seized of an estate in tail shall be 
deemed to be seized of the same in fee simple.”). For a discussion of the subsequent 
history of the fee tail in North Carolina, see Orth, supra note 153 at 786–93; see generally 
John V. Orth, After the Revolution: “Reform” of the Law of Inheritance, 10 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 33 (1992) (discussing of the abolition of the fee tail in the context of colonial and 
post-Revolutionary America). 
 156. Benson, 202 N.C. App at 290, 688 S.E.2d at 757. 
 157. See id. at 291, 688 S.E.2d at 758. 
 158. Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, 364 N.C. 239, 239, 698 S.E.2d 391, 
391–92 (2010) (dismissing appeal ex mero motu). 
 159. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §	7A-30 (2015) (“[A]n appeal lies of right to the 
Supreme Court from any decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in a case: (1) Which 
directly involves a substantial question arising under the Constitution of the United States 
or of this State .	.	.	.”). Section	7A-30 was amended in December 2016 to render 
unavailable the appeal of right in a case decided by a panel in which there was a dissent 
“until after the Court of Appeals sitting en banc has rendered a decision in the case .	.	. or 
until after the time for filing a motion for rehearing of the cause by the Court of Appeals 
has expired or the Court of Appeals has denied the motion for rehearing.” Act of Dec. 16, 
2016, ch. 125 sec. 22.(c), §	7A-30(2), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 32. 
 160. See generally §	7A-31 (providing that certification after determination by the 
Court of Appeals may be allowed “when in the opinion of the Supreme Court: (1) The 
subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or (2) The cause involves legal 
principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State .	.	.	”). 
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substantial constitutional question.161 The Supreme Court denied all 
three motions.162 
This case would have benefitted from further review. The 
Supreme Court could have considered whether the lower court had 
properly understood perpetuities law.163 If the North Carolina 
Constitution did require application of the common law Rule Against 
Perpetuities, as claimed by the living beneficiaries, they would not 
have been entitled to immediate distribution. When unvested future 
interests are invalidated by the Rule, vested present interests are 
unaffected.164 As applied to the Benson Trust, that would have meant 
preserving the life interests of the living beneficiaries165 and passing 
the invalid remainder interests to Settlor by resulting trust.166 
Greater attention should have also been paid to the interests of 
Settlor’s unborn heirs. If the 2007 statute that amended USRAP was 
held unconstitutional and the unamended USRAP was thereby 
restored,167 then the interests of Settlor’s unborn heirs that would vest 
within ninety years would be valid. The only beneficiaries who were 
certain to be disadvantaged by a declaration of the unconstitutionality 
of the 2007 statute were Settlor’s unborn heirs whose identities were 
not ascertained within ninety years. But even at the end of ninety 
 
 161. See Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, 364 N.C. 600, 600, 703 S.E.2d 157, 
157–58 (2010). All three motions were filed under Rule 2 of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, which permits a court of the appellate division to suspend or vary the Rules 
when necessary “[t]o prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision in the 
public interest.” N.C. R. APP. P. 2; see also Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak 
Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 196, 657 S.E.2d 361, 364 (2008) (discussing Rule 2). 
 162. Benson, 364 N.C. at 600, 703 S.E.2d at 157–58 (denying all three motions in three 
separate orders). 
 163. In addition, the court could have considered various “procedural anomalies” 
identified in Russell A. Willis III, Landmark or Mirage, N.C. LAW.’S WKLY, May 23, 2016, 
at 4, 10. 
 164. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 119, at 877–81 (introducing the basics of 
the Rule Against Perpetuities). If the Benson Trust is a revocable inter vivos trust, the 
common law perpetuities period would not even have begun to run until the power to 
revoke terminates. 
 165. Depending on the condition precedent, Settlor’s sister’s contingent interest might 
have been valid. 
 166. “A resulting trust is an equitable reversionary interest that arises by operation of 
law .	.	. if an express trust fails or makes an incomplete distribution .	.	.	.” DUKEMINIER & 
SITKOFF, supra note 119, at 416. 
 167. Although it was once the rule that repeal of a statute that repeals a prior statute 
revives the repealed statute, this is no longer true. For a discussion of this canon of 
statutory construction, see John V. Orth, Blackstone’s Rules for the Construction of 
Statutes, in BLACKSTONE AND HIS COMMENTARIES: BIOGRAPHY, LAW, HISTORY 79, 80–
82 (Wilfrid Prest ed., 2009). However, the unconstitutionality of a repealing statute may 
have that effect in light of the legislature’s likely intention. 
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years, interests that remain unvested are subject to reformation under 
USRAP “in the manner that most closely approximates the 
transferor’s manifested plan of distribution”168—perhaps resulting in 
the immediate distribution to them of the remaining principal.169 
The constitutional question in Benson particularly deserved 
further examination. The claim by the living beneficiaries that the 
North Carolina Constitution incorporates the common law Rule 
Against Perpetuities was thinly supported. Only two North Carolina 
cases were cited: a Supreme Court decision repeating the 
unremarkable proposition that the common law Rule is a rule of law, 
to be applied “irrespective of the question of intention,”170 and a 
Court of Appeals decision that the Rule “has the continuing sanction 
of Article I, Section 34 of our State Constitution.”171 It was generally 
accepted at the time that the Court of Appeals did not mean that the 
common law Rule Against Perpetuities was constitutionally 
required,172 and in 1995 the General Assembly acted on that 
assumption when it adopted USRAP and the companion statutes,173 
 
 168. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	41-17 (2015). 
 169. According to one commentator, under the terms of the Benson Trust distributions 
are discretionary and income may be accumulated indefinitely. Willis, supra note 163, at 4. 
If so, the principal at termination could be substantial. But indefinite accumulation of 
income would raise a question under the common law rule against accumulations, which 
prohibits accumulations beyond the perpetuities period. An amendment to North 
Carolina perpetuities law adopted in 2014, seven years after the execution of the Benson 
Trust, exempts trusts from the common law rule against accumulations. §	41-23(h). 
 170. Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 103 52 S.E.2d 229, 230 (1949) (citing N.C. CONST. 
of 1868 art. I, §	31). The Court of Appeals in Benson failed to recognize that the sections 
of the Declaration of Rights had been renumbered in 1971, and thought that “[t]he 
Supreme Court erroneously cited section 31 of the Declaration of Rights, which addresses 
the quartering of soldiers. The relevant constitutional provision addressing perpetuities is 
section 34.” Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, 202 N.C. App. 283, 288 n.7, 688 
S.E.2d 752, 757 n.7 (2010). On the nature of the Rule Against Perpetuities, see GRAY, 
supra note 111, §	629 (“The Rule against Perpetuities is not a rule of construction, but a 
peremptory command of law. It is not, like a rule of construction, a test, more or less 
artificial, to determine intention. Its object is to defeat intention.”). 
 171. N.C. Nat’l Bank v. Norris, 21 N.C. App. 178, 180, 203 S.E.2d 657, 658 (1974). 
 172. JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE 
GUIDE 76 (1993) (“Although the North Carolina Court of Appeals has mentioned in 
passing that the application of [the common law Rule Against Perpetuities] has the 
‘continuing sanction’ of [section 34] .	.	. [this] should not be taken to mean that the Rule 
Against Perpetuities in its present formulation is beyond the reach of the legislature.”). 
 173. See Act of July 29, 1995, ch. 525, art. 3 §	41-29, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1911, 1912 
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§	41-28 to -33 (2015)); Rich, Rich, & Nance v. Carolina 
Constr. Corp., 355 N.C. 190, 194, 558 S.E.2d, 77, 79 (2002) (assuming validity of USRAP); 
see also Benson, 202 N.C. App. at 288–89, 688 S.E.2d at 756 (“The General Assembly’s 
modification of the common law rule against perpetuities through passage of the Uniform 
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (‘USRAP’) in 1995 supports our interpretation of the 
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all of which permitted departures from the Rule.174 The question of 
whether the Constitution incorporates the common law Rule Against 
Perpetuities was easily answered in the negative. 
Further review of Benson would have allowed the Supreme 
Court to decide what the constitutional ban on perpetuities forbids—
or, alternatively, what it allows. Analysis would have been materially 
aided by recognition of the distinction between legal and equitable 
interests in trusts. “The hallmark characteristic of a common law trust 
is bifurcation: The trustee holds legal title to the trust property, but 
the beneficiaries have equitable or beneficial ownership.”175 Stated in 
these terms, the issue in Benson is whether the North Carolina 
Constitution permits the remote vesting of future equitable interests 
in property. 
As recognized by the Court of Appeals, the state’s first 
constitution associated perpetuities with entails and directed the 
legislature to “regulate entails, in such manner as to prevent 
perpetuities.”176 When complying with that direction in 1784, the 
General Assembly explained that the North Carolina Constitution 
declared perpetuities to be “contrary to the genius of a free state”177 
because “entails of estates tend only to raise the wealth and 
importance of particular families and individuals, giving them an 
unequal and undue influence in a republic, and prove in manifold 
instances the source of great contention and injustice.”178 The living 
beneficiaries in Benson candidly acknowledged that the constitutional 
ban on perpetuities had been adopted “in the context of estate entails 
 
rule as one acceptable method for regulating unreasonable restraints on alienability rather 
than as a constitutionally required rule.”). 
 174. If the Constitution required the application of the common law Rule Against 
Perpetuities, the statutes allowing a thirty year wait-and-see period, North Carolina 
General Statutes §§	41-29 (options in gross),	41-30 (leases to commence in the future), and 
41-31 (unvested easements), would have been unconstitutional. In addition, three other 
statutes adopted at the same time, §	36A-145 (honorary trusts), §	36A-146 (trusts for pets), 
and §	36A-147 (trusts for cemetery lots), which permitted trusts without ascertainable 
beneficiaries, would also have been unconstitutional. Act of June 13, 1995, ch. 225, art. 14, 
1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1, 1–2 (repealed by Act of July 15, 2005, ch. 192 art. 9, 2005 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 1, 53 (codified at N.C. GEN STAT. §	36C9-901 (d)(1)(f) (2005))). For a discussion of 
the latter statutes, see Link & Licata, supra note 113, at 1805–07. These statutes have since 
been repealed and replaced by the North Carolina Uniform Trust Code. See N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§	36c-1-101 to -11-1106. 
 175. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 119, at 393. 
 176. N.C. CONST. of 1776, §	43. 
 177. Id. Declaration of Rights, §	23. 
 178. Act of 1784, ch. 22, §	V, reprinted in 24 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 
574 (Walter Clark ed. 1904). 
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that kept property within one family for generations.”179 Although the 
1784 legislation ended entails, successive North Carolina 
Constitutions in 1868 and 1971 continued to forbid “perpetuities,” 
suggesting that something other than legal estates such as fees tail 
were prohibited.180 The 2007 statute that amended USRAP 
eliminated restrictions on the duration of unvested equitable interests 
in trusts, allowing the creation of perpetual trusts tying up property in 
one family for generations, commonly known as “dynasty trusts”—
recognized to be “a sort of throwback to entail[s].”181 The ultimate 
issue in Benson, unreviewed by the Supreme Court, is whether the 
constitutional ban on perpetuities prohibits entails in function, as well 
as in form.182 
V.  EASEMENTS—CONTINUING ENCROACHMENT 
In 2007, in Pottle v. Link,183 a panel of the Court of Appeals 
held that an action to enjoin a continuing encroachment is subject to 
the running of the six-year statute of limitations for injury to an 
easement. 
Defendant, who owned land burdened by a thirty-foot-wide 
right-of-way easement, planted and maintained trees that encroached 
on the easement.184 Over the following nine to eleven years,185 the 
trees grew and narrowed the right of way and created an overhanging 
obstruction that prevented access by large vehicles.186 Plaintiffs, who 
 
 179. Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, 202 N.C. App. 283, 287, 688 S.E.2d 
752, 755 (2010). 
 180. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, §	31; N.C. CONST. of 1971, art. I, §	34. 
 181. Adam Hirsch, Inheritance: United States Law, in 3 OXFORD INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 235, 239 (Stanley Katz ed., 2009); see also John V. 
Orth, Escaping the Malthusian Trap: Dynasty Trusts for Serious Dynasts, 17 GREEN BAG 
2D 29, 30–31 (2013). 
 182. See Steven J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1811–12 (2014) (describing Benson’s analysis as “deeply flawed .	.	.	. 
[T]he term ‘perpetuity’ as used in the state constitution[] means an entail, in function or in 
form, with reference to alienability of beneficial ownership, not merely alienability of 
underlying property.”). 
 183. 187 N.C. App. 746, 654 S.E.2d 64 (2007), disc. rev. allowed, 663 S.E.2d 316 (N.C. 
2008), appeal dismissed, 668 S.E.2d 31 (N.C. 2008), overruled in part, Duke Energy 
Carolinas, LLC v. Gray, 369 N.C. 1, 7, 789 S.E.2d 445, 449 (2016). 
 184. Id. at 746–47, 654 S.E.2d at 65. Defendant and a co-defendant also erected fences 
that were alleged to encroach on the right of way. Id. 
 185. Id. There was evidence that during that time another individual who was also 
benefited by the easement had made attempts to have the encroaching vegetation 
removed, but had been prevented by Defendant. Id. at 748, 654 S.E.2d at 66. 
 186. Id. at 747, 654 S.E.2d at 65. 
95 N.C. L. REV 1561 (2017) 
1590 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
 
were owners of adjacent land that was benefitted by the easement, 
sued for an injunction prohibiting the burdened landowner from 
continuing to obstruct their right of way.187 Defendant asserted that 
the action was barred by the running of a six-year statute of 
limitations.188 Rejecting that defense, the superior court granted 
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.189 
The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the judgment of the 
superior court.190 The issue as presented on appeal was which of two 
statutes of limitations applied to the action: the six-year statute of 
limitations for “injury to any incorporeal hereditament,”191 or the 
twenty-year statute of limitations for adverse possession.192 A 
unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals rejected Plaintiffs’ 
argument that the twenty-year adverse possession statute applied 
since Plaintiffs were not claiming an interest in fee but rather were 
seeking to enjoin an injury to their easement.193 In consequence, it 
ruled that the proper limitations period was six years and that the 
Plaintiffs’ action was therefore barred.194 Plaintiffs petitioned for 
discretionary review, and two utility companies, presumably 
concerned about the implications for their extensive network of utility 
easements, sought and received leave to file amicus briefs in 
 
 187. Id., 654 S.E.2d at 66. An easement owner has a right to maintain the easement. 
Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 610, 290 S.E.2d 593, 598 (1982); JON W. BRUCE 
& JAMES W. ELY, JR., LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND §	8:37 (1988). In 
consequence, Plaintiffs might have been better advised to remove the obstructions 
themselves. If Defendant had prevented them, they could then have sought an injunction 
to prevent interference. 
 188. Pottle, 187 N.C. App. at 748, 654 S.E.2d at 66. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 752, 654 S.E.2d at 68. The court remanded the case for a determination of 
the location of the fences. Id. 
 191. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	1-46 (2015) (“The periods prescribed for the commencement of 
actions, other than for the recovery of real property, are as set forth in this Article.”); §	1-
50(a)(3) (“Within six years an action .	.	. [f]or injury to any incorporeal hereditament.”). An 
incorporeal hereditament is a non-possessory, inheritable property interest such as an 
easement. 
 192. §	1-40 (“No action for the recovery of possession of real property, or the issues 
and profits thereof, shall be maintained when the person in possession thereof, or 
defendant in the action, or those under whom he claims, has possessed the property under 
known and visible lines and boundaries adversely to all other persons for 20 years; and 
such possession so held gives a title in fee to the possessor, in such property, against all 
persons not under disability.”); see also Pottle, 187 N.C. App. at 749, 654 S.E.2d at 67. 
 193. Pottle, 187 N.C. App. at 751, 654 S.E.2d at 68. 
 194. Id. 
95 N.C. L. REV 1561 (2017) 
2017] DEVELOPMENTS IN N.C. PROPERTY LAW 1591 
 
support.195 The Supreme Court initially granted Plaintiffs’ petition196 
but subsequently, on the motion of both parties, dismissed their 
appeal.197 
If the Supreme Court had reviewed the Pottle decision, it could 
have considered the merits and clarified the law concerning 
continuing injuries to an easement without the need for further 
litigation. It is seemingly well settled that an easement by prescription 
can be created by adverse use by a benefitted party and that the 
prescriptive period is twenty years.198 Correspondingly, it seems that 
an easement can be terminated by the reverse process: adverse use by 
the burdened landowner for the prescriptive period.199 The root of the 
problem in Pottle is that the prescriptive period for the creation and 
termination of easements is not established by statute. The twenty-
year statute of limitations for adverse possession is obviously 
inapplicable to an action to enjoin a continuing encroachment on an 
easement. The adverse possession statute limits, as its terms indicate, 
an “action for the recovery of possession,” and gives a person who has 
proved the elements of adverse possession “a title in fee.”200 But an 
 
 195. Pottle v. Link, 663 S.E.2d 317 (N.C. 2008) (petition of Carolina Power & Light); 
id. (petition of Duke Energy). 
 196. Pottle v. Link, 362 N.C. 361, 663 S.E.2d 316 (2008). 
 197. Pottle v. Link, 362 N.C. 509, 668 S.E.2d 31 (2008). 
 198. See WEBSTER, JR., supra note 79, §	15-18[1].  
To establish an easement by prescription, the party seeking to do so must show the 
following by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the use is adverse, hostile, 
or under claim of right; (2) that the use has been open and notorious such that the 
true owner had notice of the claim; (3) that the use has been continuous and 
uninterrupted for at least twenty years; and (4) that there is substantial identity of 
the easement claimed throughout the twenty-year period. 
 Id.  
 199. Id. §	15-32.  
An easement may be extinguished through adverse user by the servient owner for 
the prescriptive period. Since easements may be created by prescription, by a 
reverse process they may also be lost if the servient owner refuses to recognize the 
rights of the easement holder and prevents the use of the easement for the 
statutory period. In order to extinguish an easement, the interference or user by 
the servient owner must be adverse to the easement holder, continuous, 
uninterrupted, and for the prescriptive period. 
Id. “User” in this section means simply use, “the exercise or employment of a right or 
property.” See User, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). Adverse use by the 
burdened landowner for the prescriptive period technically results in the landowner’s 
acquisition of the easement, which merges with the landowner’s fee simple and thereby 
terminates. 
 200. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	1-40 (2015). 
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easement is a nonpossessory (incorporeal) interest. An easement 
owner has the right to use the land of another, not the right to possess 
it.201 The prescriptive period for the creation and termination of 
easements was adopted by analogy to the period for acquiring a title 
by adverse possession.202 Therefore, if twenty years of adverse 
possession is sufficient to acquire a fee, twenty years of adverse use 
should be enough to secure an easement. 
Plaintiffs in Pottle were not seeking title to the land subject to the 
encroachment but only an injunction to preserve their right of use. 
Once it is realized that the prescriptive period is not a statutory 
period but a common law limitation, the focus shifts to whether the 
statute of limitations for actions for “injury to any incorporeal 
hereditament”203 is appropriate for a continuing injury, such as in 
Pottle, or only for a transient injury.204 A continuing encroachment on 
an easement that cannot be enjoined reduces the dimensions of the 
easement pro tanto. While the record title to the burdened land in 
Pottle will continue to show a thirty-foot easement for the benefit of 
the adjacent landowners, the easement is narrowed to the extent of 
the encroachment.205 Unless an easement owner has a cause of action 
 
 201. See Pottle v. Link, 187 N.C. App. 746, 749, 654 S.E.2d 64, 67 (2007) (citing 
Builders Supplies Co. v. Gainey, 282 N.C. 261, 266, 192 S.E.2d 449, 453 (1972)) (describing 
an affirmative easement as “a right to make some use of land owned by another without 
taking a part thereof”). 
 202. “In most jurisdictions, the period of prescription [for the creation of easements] is 
derived by analogy from the statute of limitations governing actions to recover possession 
of land.” Bruce & Ely, supra note 187, § 5:17, at 5-70. 
In order for an easement to be extinguished by prescription, the servient owner’s 
use or possession must satisfy the same elements required for obtaining an 
easement by prescription. Thus, the use or possession must be adverse, open and 
notorious, and continuous and uninterrupted, and it must last for the prescriptive 
period, which is generally the same period required for creating an easement by 
prescription. 
Id. § 10-25, at 10-66 to -67. 
 203. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	1-50(a)(3). 
 204. Plaintiffs should at least be entitled under the statute to an injunction to prevent 
the encroachment from growing further over the next six years. 
 205. This is presumably what is meant by the comment in an influential treatise on 
North Carolina property law: “The holding of Pottle is not necessarily inconsistent” with 
the law concerning the termination of an easement by twenty years’ adverse use. 
WEBSTER, JR., supra note 79, §	15-32 n.289. For a discussion of the ambiguity lurking in 
the words “burden of an easement,” see ORTH, supra note 57, at 57–62. 
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to remove such an encroachment, the easement owner does not own 
the easement to its full extent. Without a remedy, there is no right.206 
In 2014, the precedent set in Pottle was followed by the Court of 
Appeals in Duke Energy Carolinas v. Gray.207 In that case, 
Defendant’s house was constructed on a portion of the utility 
company’s easement.208 Although Duke Energy discovered the 
encroachment and demanded its removal, the company waited more 
than six years to file suit seeking an injunction.209 The trial court 
granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and a unanimous 
panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.210 The judges of 
the intermediate appellate court commented, 
even if we agreed with plaintiff that Pottle was wrongly decided, 
we would nonetheless be bound by its holding. “Where a panel 
of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a 
different case, a subsequent panel is bound by that precedent, 
unless it has been overturned by an intervening decision from a 
higher court.” In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 
30, 37 (1989). Accordingly, we do not address plaintiff’s 
arguments regarding the substantive merits of the Pottle 
decision.211 
Unlike Pottle and the other cases discussed in this Article, in 
which decisions of subsequent panels that applied a precedent set by a 
prior panel went unreviewed because the Supreme Court either failed 
 
 206. Although a legal maxim proclaims “ubi jus ibi remedium,” HERBERT BROOM, 
LEGAL MAXIMS *191 (8th American ed. 1882), the converse is also true: where there is no 
remedy, there is no right. For examples of the latter, see JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL 
POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
4–5, 52, 107 (1987). 
 207. 237 N.C. App. 420, 766 S.E.2d 354 (2014), rev’d, 369 N.C. 1, 3, 789 S.E.2d 445, 446 
(2016). In 2015 a superior court, following the precedent set in Pottle, ruled that the six-
year statute of limitations for injury to an incorporeal hereditament applied to an action 
seeking a declaratory judgment that an easement had been terminated by adverse use. See 
Lewis v. Hedgepeth, No. COA15-914, 2017 WL 1079620, at *1–2 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 
2017) (unpublished) (explaining the “long-running legal dispute” between the parties). On 
appeal, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals held the case in abeyance awaiting the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Duke Power. See Hedgepeth v. Parker’s Landing Prop. 
Owners Ass’n Inc., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___ 781 S.E.2d 822, 823–25 (2016). After the 
Supreme Court overruled Pottle, the panel reversed and remanded the case. Lewis v. 
Hedgepeth, No. COA15-914, 2017 WL 1079620, at *6 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2017). 
 208. Duke Energy, 237 N.C. App. at 423, 766 S.E.2d at 356. 
 209. See id. at 425, 766 S.E.2d at 358. 
 210. Id. at 424, 430, 766 S.E.2d at 357, 361. 
 211. Id. at 429, 766 S.E.2d at 361 (quoting In re Appeal from Civil Penalty,	324 N.C. 
373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989)). 
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to certify the case on its own motion (Kotis)212 or denied a petition for 
discretionary review (Khwaja),213 Duke Energy’s petition for 
discretionary review was allowed.214 In 2016, the Supreme Court 
overturned the precedent set by the Court of Appeals in Pottle nine 
years earlier: “[W]e overrule the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
Pottle v. Link, insofar as that opinion deemed [North Carolina 
General Statutes] Section 1-40 inapplicable to actions involving 
encroachments on easements.”215 
Although the Supreme Court did not clarify which suits for 
“injury to [an] incorporeal hereditament” would be barred by the six-
year statute of limitations, it did indicate that the twenty-year period 
for adverse possession was applicable to “actions involving 
encroachments on easements”—at least, to encroachments of a 
permanent character.216 Presumably twenty years obstruction of an 
easement by the burdened landowner would be required to terminate 
an easement, just as twenty years of adverse use would give rise to an 
easement by prescription.  
It took a determined and deep-pocketed plaintiff to undertake a 
challenge to a precedent set by a panel of the Court of Appeals in the 
certain knowledge that it would suffer defeat in the trial court and a 
unanimous adverse judgment in the Court of Appeals, in the hope 
that it would ultimately be able to convince the Supreme Court to 
overturn the precedent. 
VI.  LOOKING FORWARD—THE EN BANC PROCEDURE AND THE 
FUTURE ROLE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
There is reason to hope that the new en banc procedure of the 
Court of Appeals will bring benefits to the Appellate Division of 
North Carolina’s General Court of Justice.217 It will give the Court of 
Appeals a corporate character for the first time, making it more than 
a mere collection of panels.218 It will eliminate the risk that a 
randomly chosen group of three Court of Appeals judges will create a 
 
 212. See supra text accompanying note 78. 
 213. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
 214. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Gray, 773 S.E.2d 57, 57 (N.C. 2015). 
 215. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Gray 369 N.C. 1, 7, 789 S.E.2d 445, 449 (2016). 
 216. Id. 
 217. See generally Orth, supra note 21 (discussing the potential benefits an en banc 
procedure could bring to the North Carolina Court of Appeals). 
 218. Id. at 1982 (referring to the Court of Appeals without a procedure for sitting en 
banc as “not a single court at all, but only a collection of panels”). 
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precedent, binding all other panels of the court, with which a majority 
of the judges disagree.219 This may reduce unnecessary appeals to the 
Supreme Court and will provide a more fully developed record for 
appeals that the Supreme Court does accept.220 
On the other hand, the new en banc procedure will increase the 
workload of a court that is already very busy, and that will be coping 
with its increased workload with fewer judges as the size of the court 
is progressively reduced.221 The judges will be expected to monitor 
filings and be prepared to call for an en banc hearing in cases they 
deem appropriate. They will be expected to review the decisions of all 
other panels and to decide whether to call for rehearing en banc. 
They will be required to decide motions for rehearing en banc—
motions that may be filed frequently, as there is reason to fear that 
criminal defense lawyers will feel bound to move for rehearing in any 
case in which their client’s appeal is rejected by a panel. And, of 
course, they will be required to decide cases accepted by a majority of 
the judges for hearing or rehearing en banc. Moreover, the new 
statute increases the Court of Appeals caseload by adding appeals 
from the special three-judge Superior Court, if that court holds a state 
statute “facially invalid” for violation of the North Carolina 
Constitution or federal law, or if the three-judge panel declares 
invalid an act redistricting congressional or legislative districts.222 
Before weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the en 
banc procedure however, two serious questions concerning the new 
statute need to be addressed. A suggestion has been made that the 
North Carolina Constitution prohibits the Court of Appeals from 
sitting en banc.223 Referring to the Court of Appeals, the state 
constitution provides that it “may be authorized to sit in divisions, or 
other than en banc.”224 Although the constitutional text can be read to 
 
 219. Id. (observing that “[a]lthough further thought or practical experience may 
convince a later panel of the unsoundness or impracticality of a rule,” without a procedure 
for sitting en banc the rule “must continue to be applied until overruled by the supreme 
court”). 
 220. Id. (observing that an en banc procedure may eliminate “needless appeals to a 
higher court” and will provide “a fully developed record” for those that do go forward). 
 221. See supra note 10. In the last two decades, the Court of Appeals has consistently 
heard more than a thousand cases a year. Orr, supra note 14, at 217. 
 222. Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(a), §	7A-16, 2016 N.C. Sess. Law 10, 30. 
 223. David Donovan, Assembly Rushes Appellate Changes, N.C. LAW.’S WKLY, Dec. 
26, 2016, at 6. (“The courts will likely also have to decide whether en banc hearings are 
permitted under the state’s constitution.”). 
 224. N.C. CONST. art. IV, §	7. The Court of Appeals was never authorized to sit in 
divisions, either geographic divisions or subject matter divisions. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	7A-16 
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prohibit the General Assembly from authorizing the Court of 
Appeals to sit en banc, the text can also be read simply to allow the 
legislature to authorize sitting other than en banc.225 This question 
would seem to require resolution by the Supreme Court before the en 
banc procedure can be accepted.226 
An additional question may arise concerning the holding of the 
Supreme Court that gave the decision of a panel of the Court of 
Appeals precedential value: “Where a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent 
panel is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by an 
intervening decision from a higher court.”227 Is the Court of Appeals 
hearing a case en banc bound by a precedent set by a three-judge 
panel of that court in a prior case? The answer may simply be that the 
Court of Appeals sitting en banc is not “a subsequent panel.” 
Alternatively, it may be that the Court of Appeals sitting en banc is 
“a higher court,” enabled to overturn a precedent set by a three-judge 
panel.228 This question too would seem to require resolution by the 
Supreme Court in an appropriate case. 
CONCLUSION 
In significant instances in the last decade, important decisions 
concerning basic North Carolina property law have been made by 
three-judge panels of the Court of Appeals rather than by the seven-
member Supreme Court. Constitutional questions concerning 
 
(2015) (“The Court of Appeals shall sit in panels of three judges each .	.	.	.”). The North 
Carolina Courts Commission, established in 1963 to advise the General Assembly on the 
creation of the Court of Appeals, expressly recommended against “dividing the State into 
a number of geographic divisions.” N.C. COURTS COMM’N, supra note 12, at 8. 
 225. See Orth, supra note 21 at 1985 (“In context, the express constitutional permission 
to authorize sittings ‘other than en banc’ seems designed to rebut a possible inference that 
the judges of the court of appeals necessarily would, like the supreme court, always sit en 
banc.”). 
 226. Although the Supreme Court’s prompt issuance of Rule 31.1 implementing the en 
banc procedure may be taken as Supreme Court acceptance of its constitutionality, the 
rule was issued without an adversarial proceeding in which opposing arguments could be 
heard. SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA, ORDER ADOPTING RULE 31.1 OF THE 
NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, 369 N.C. ___, ___ (Dec. 22, 2016), 
http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/html/pdf/Rule-31.1.pdf [http://perma.cc/M9L4-C6R4]. 
 227. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (N.C. 1989). 
 228. Unanswered is whether a decision made by the Court of Appeals sitting en banc 
that is subsequently affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court would have 
precedential value. See generally Orth, supra note 19 (suggesting that “a court of appeals 
decision affirmed by an equally divided supreme court could be allowed to have 
precedential value,” despite its lacking such value under current North Carolina case law). 
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whether the state can seize the interest earned on an asset in the 
state’s custody (Rowlette)229 and whether it can allow perpetually 
unvested interests in private trusts (Benson)230 have been decided 
without the high court’s review. Important decisions concerning the 
law of landlord and tenant—whether a tenant’s ex ante waiver of a 
commercial landlord’s duty to mitigate damages is contrary to public 
policy (Sylva Shops)231 and whether public policy requires the 
application of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities to rights of 
first refusal in leases (New Bar)232—have also been functionally 
delegated by the Supreme Court to panels of the Court of Appeals. 
And a fundamental conflict in statutes of limitation concerning 
actions for possession of real property and actions for injury to 
nonpossessory property interests (Pottle)233 has been left for 
resolution by a panel of the intermediate appellate court. In each of 
these cases, the precedent set by the panel of the Court of Appeals 
binds all subsequent panels that confront the same issue. Only in the 
last case was the issue belatedly addressed by the Supreme Court, and 
then only because of the persistence of a major corporation. 
In the constitutional cases (Rowlette and Benson), appeals of 
right were dismissed, presumably because the Supreme Court did not 
consider the constitutional question in each case to be “substantial.” 
In the two landlord-tenant cases (Sylva Shops and New Bar) and in 
the case concerning the statutes of limitations (Pottle), the decisions 
went unreviewed by the Supreme Court, either because no review 
was sought and review sua sponte was not granted (Sylva Shops and 
New Bar) or because the appeal was dismissed on the motion of the 
parties (Pottle). In all three cases, the precedents set were soon 
followed by subsequent panels of the Court of Appeals (Kotis, 
Khwaja, and Duke Power), despite some uneasiness expressed by 
judges in the latter two cases. In only one of the subsequent cases did 
the Supreme Court grant discretionary review (Duke Power). 
According to the original plan, the intermediate appellate court 
was intended to relieve an overworked Supreme Court of the burden 
of correcting error in routine cases in order to allow it the opportunity 
to give extended consideration to cases of general jurisprudential 
significance. Over the years, that plan has been lost sight of, and the 
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Court of Appeals has become in many such cases the de facto court of 
last resort. Facing the likelihood of adverse decisions in the trial and 
intermediate appellate courts, only well-resourced litigants adversely 
affected by a precedent set by a panel of the Court of Appeals will be 
able to seek the attention of the Supreme Court. And the Supreme 
Court’s historic role in developing the state’s common law will in 
many instances be surrendered to the lower court. 
 
